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STOCK ISSUES UNDER THE UNIFORM
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
ROBERT S. STEVENSt
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
at its session in August, 1927, tentatively approved a Uniform Busi-
ness Corporation Act. Ten drafts have been before the Conference
since the subject was first taken up by it in 191o. The act which has
now been tentatively approved is, therefore, the result of painstaking
study and of conscientious consideration and discussion. It will
come before the Conference for final approval at its next session in
July of this year.
It is to be borne in mind that the Uniform Business Corporation
Act is intended to authorize and control only private business cor-
portions, and not public service, banking, trust or insurance corpora-
tions. The most important and essential provisions of any corpora-
tion act are those dealing with the financial structure of the corpora-
tions which it regulates. The purpose of the present article is to
explain the theory of these provisions in the Uniform Act and to sup-
port that theory by a brief survey of the evolution of the law dealing
with the process of capitalizing corporations and of affording reason-
able protection to the shareholders on the one side and other members
of the public on the other side.
"The personal responsibility of the stockholders is inconsistent
with the nature of a body corporate."' In thinking of the responsi-
bility of the shareholders for corporate debts, this is undoubtedly the
normal rule. It is a conclusion usually found to result from the deci-
sive reason that the obligation was incurred not by the shareholders,
but by a legal unit distinct from them.2 The same conclusion may
be reached by regarding corporate obligations as the obligations of
the incorporated associates who have been given, not an exemption
from, but a limitation of liability.3
tProfessor of Law, Cornell Law School; Draftsman of the Uniform Business
Corporation Act.
]Myers v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & R. 368, 371, (Pa. i8x6) per Tilghnan, C. J. E.H.
Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of a Corporation (1923) 36 HARV. L..REv.5o9,
516. But see Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations before x8oo
(1888) 2 HARV. L. REv. 149, 16o.
2People ex rel Winchester v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 284, 31 N. E. 96 (1852);
Warren, op. cit. supra note I, at 519.
3 H-ohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporate Debts (I9O9)
9 COL. L. REV. 285.
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However, the limitation of the individual liability of shareholders
is by no means an inseparable incident of incorporation. Immunity
from individual liability has not always been the rule, and today there
are statutes under which full liability of shareholders is either optional
or compulsory.4
In reviewing the development of individual liability, Professor E. H.
Warren has pointed out that in the early history of corporation law,
shares could be allotted for any kind or amount of consideration,
there was no requirement of paid-in capital, and it was customary
to pay dividends out of capital. He finds that whether we search in
charters, parliamentary acts, or judicial decisions, "our conclusion is
that in every American jurisdiction in which the law is based upon the
law of Great Britain as it existed at the time of the Revolution, there
were at the start no safeguards provided by law for the protection of
the creditors of corporations in addition to those provided for the
protection of the creditors of individuals."5
With the beginning of the nineteenth century, the pendulum
swung the other way. The interest of members was required to be
divided into shares; shares must have a par value; the amount of the
par value had to be paid in full, and no part of the capital thus
received could be returned to the shareholders by way of dividends or
otherwise. The full contribution of this corporate capital was the
required substitute for individual responsibility. To make certain
-that shares were paid in full, it was for a time required that they
should be paid for in money.6
4N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 6: "Every corporation formed under this chapter may
be or become a full liability corporation by inserting a statement in the certificate
of incorporation, that the corporation thereby formed is intended to be a full
liability corporation;..." Corning v. McCullough, i N. Y. 47 (I847).
Calif. Const., Art. XII, § 3: "Each stockholder of a corporation or joint stock
association shall be individually and personally liable for such proportion of all its
debts and liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was a stockholder,
as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the sub-
scribed capital stock or shares of the corporation or association." See also Kerr's
Calif. Civ. Code § 322 (2d. ed. 192o) and Const., Art XII, § I5 as to shareholders
of foreign corporations.
5Warren, op. cit. supra note i, at 522-3.
6See for example, N. Y. Laws 1848, c. 40, § 14: "Nothing but money shall be
considered as payment of any part of the capital stock." Amended by L. 1853, c.
333, § 2, to permit the kind of corporations named in the act to receive property
necessary for their business and "issue stock to the amount of the value thereof in
payment therefor." See also U. S. Stat. 1870, c. 80, § 4, regulating corporations
of the District of Columbia and construed in Maine v. Butler, 130 Mass. 196
(881). See other cases cited infra note z5.
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As an additional security for creditors, some jurisdictions retained
a conditional liability of shareholders. Thus, in Massachusetts from
1829 to 1870, shareholders were individually liable for all corporate
debts until the whole amount of the authorized capital had been paid
in and a certificate to that effect had been filed,7 but in I87o this was
restricted so that only those shareholders who had not paid in full for
their shares continued liable to creditors to the extent of the amount
of capital remaining unpaid.8 A similar situation is found in the
progress of the law of New York. The manufacturing corporation act
of 1848 imposed upon every shareholder, even though his own shares
were fully paid, individual liability to corporate creditors to an
amount equal to the par value of shares held by him until the whole
amount of the authorized capital stock had been paid up.9 In 1892,
the risk of such liability was lessened by making it conditioned upon
non-payment of the whole amount of the capital stock issued and
outstanding at the time the particular corporate debt was incurred.10
Finally, in i9oI, this double liability was removed, and there was
substituted the provision which now exists that a shareholder shall be
liable to creditors only to the extent that shares held by him are not
fully paid." These changes in the statutes indicate the progressive
attempts to reconcile the conflicting claims of creditors and share-
holders, with a resulting grant of increased security to the share-
holders at the expense of the creditors. The demands of economic
progress call for the fullest exemption from individual liability that is
consistent with reasonable security for corporate creditors and inves-
tors. The harshness of the early Massachusetts rule of liability
without limit induced Chief justice Shaw to say that "the law looks
also to the relief of the stockholders, as well as the security of those
who deal with the company", and to decide that when the sworn
certificate of full payment has been filed as required by statute, no
creditor should be allowed to dispute the fact of payment.2 On the
other hand, the liability under the New York statute being limited to
the amount of the par value of shares held by the individual, the New
7St. 1829, c. 53, § 6; R. S. (1836) c. 38, § 17. Warren, op. cit. supra note i, at
326.
"St. 1870, C. 224, § 39. Warren, ibid.
OL. 1848, c. 40, § io. A like provision was contained in the Business Corpo-
rationActof 1875, L. 1875, c. 61I, § 37. A similar situation existed under the
Illinois corporation law of 1857, see Kipp v. Bell, 86 Ill. 577 (1877).
10L. 1892, c. 688, § 54. See also § 55 for conditions and limitations of liability.
"L. 1901, c. 354, § 54. For existing statutory provisions in New York, see
S. C. L., § § 70-73.12Stedman v. Eveleth, 6 Mete. 114, 120 (Mass. 1843).
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York court was inclined to interpret its statute more favorably for
the creditor and to permit him to disprove the fact of payment,
established only primafacie by the certificate similarly filed.13
Granted that a shareholder is liable only to the extent that the
shares held by him are not fully paid, when are shares fully paid?
That is a question of no great difficulty when the subscription contract
calls for payment in money. As we have seen, some early statutes
stipulated that nothing but money could be received by a corporation
in payment for its shares.1 4 Under such statutes, some courts found
themselves mechanically compelled to say that an acceptance of any
consideration other than money would violate the statute, and that
it would be no defence to a shareholder that he had transferred to
the corporation consideration of equivalent money value. 5 Such a
defence would but raise that most troublesome question, whether the
proposed substitute for money was of equal value with the money
actually required to make up the capital. "It (the statute) intended
to give creditors of such an incorporation such security as might re-
sult from the original contribution of the capital in cash,-whatever
might be done with it afterwards."'16 In this one sentence, we have
a profession of the state's policy to guarantee that the aggregate
amount of the par value of shares outstanding represents the value
of capital assets, and at the same time a naive confession of the un-
reliability of the guarantee. In construing the same statutory pro-
vision, a subsequent New York court had to decide whether a share-
holder had made a good payment by cancelling a debt due him
from the corporation for labor done. This court, employing a less
mechanistic method of judicial process, held the payment good,
reasoning that "if the company had paid the money to Jones in
discharge of the debt due him, and then Jones had handed back
the same money as payment upon his stock, no question could
have arisen. Precisely the same thing was the substance of the
transaction, although the form of passing the money was omitted."' 7
Similar -reasoning has been employed in construing other statutes
'Veeder v. Mudgett, 95 N. Y. 295 (1884).
14Supra note 6.
'VMaine v. Butler, supra note 6; McDaniel v. Harvey, 51 Mo. App. 198, 205
(1892); People v. Troy House Co., 44 Barb. 625 (N. Y. 1865). Henry v. Ver-
million etc. R. R., 17 Ohio, 187, 191 (1848), provision in charter.
6People v. Troy House Co., supra note 15, at 636. See also cases in note 42
infra.
17Veeder v. Mudgett, supra note 13, at 315.
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which were silent as to the proper medium of payment for shares.' 8
The inevitable realization of the impracticability of compelling
corporations to resort to this circuitous method of first raising money
with which to pay for property which they might lawfully purchase
has produced in practically every American jurisdiction express
statutory authority to accept property, other than money, in payment
for shares. 9 Most jurisdictions, but not all of them, also expressly
permit shares to be allotted in consideration of services rendered to the
corporation .2  However, the majority of American legislatures, while
granting this permission, did not recede from the policy of attempting
by one device or another to assure the public that the aggregate par
value of shares outstanding was a true indicator of the actual value of
the consideration received therefor.
The most paternalistic method of insuring the full payment of
shares is that employed by Massachusetts from 1875 to 1903. As a
prerequisite to the validity of payment in property, the commissioner
of corporations was required to certify that he was satisfied that the
valuation which had been put upon the property was fair and reason-
able.2' The present Iowa practice is very similar. Under the provi-
sions of the code in that state, application has to be made to the
executive council for leave to allot shares for any consideration other
than money, and the executive council is required to make investiga-
tion and fix the value at which the consideration may be received by
the corporation in payment for shares.H A system of state appraisal
has at least two practical objections: first, the obstacles encountered
when the property to be valued is situated outside the state, and se-
cond, the danger of guaranteeing value in view of the fallibility of
even state appraisers.u
18Brant v. Ehlen, 59 Md. I, 29 (1882); Lee v. Cutrer, 96 Miss. 355, 51 So.
8o8 (I9IO); Boot and Shoe Co. v. Hoit, 56 N. H. 548, 558 (1876); East N. Y. and
Jamaica R. R. Co. v. Lighthall, 36 How. Pr. 481 (N. Y. x868). 5 THOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 3977, 398o; notes in (1910) 27 L. R. A. (N. s.)
315 and ANN. CAS. 19 12B, 478. Pell's Case, 5 Ch. App. ii (1869); Re Baglan
Hall Colliery Co., 5 Ch. App. 346 (1870).
'
9 The first express statutory permission in New York seems to have been
granted in 1853, supra note 6. In Massachusetts, the first statutory authority is
found in L. 1875, C. 177, § 2.
20For reference to various constitutional and statutory provisions and a sug-
gestive summary thereof, see 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (1918) §§ 3525-3575.
21L. 1875, c. 177, § 2. Repealed by L. 1903, C. 437, § § 14 and 95. See post p. 414.
22Iowa Code (1927) §§ 8413-8417. Sykes v. Pure Food Cider Co., 157 Iowa,
6Ol, 138 N. W. 554 (1912).
23W. W. Cook, "Watered SocV"-Commissions"-Blue Sky Laws"-Stock without
Par Value (1921) 19 MICH. L. REv. 583, 598.
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A much less effective device was that resorted to in Illinois from
,905 to i921.2 In liei of a state valuation, there was required an
affidavit of three persons who could swear that in their opinions the
value of the consideration to be received was equal to the par value of
the shares to be allotted. These persons were not to be state ap-
pointed, nor even impartial appraisers; they were the incorporators
themselves. The statutory conditions having been compiled with,
the shareholders would be protected from further liability, but the
security thus afforded the persons dealing with the corporation would
indeed be illusory. This scheme is still employed in Utah.2
A cruel method of guaranteeing that a dollar of par value means a
dollar of corporate capital paid in, or to be paid in, is that inflicted
under the "true value rule". Though the utmost good faith and
conservatism may have been exercised in placing a value upon the
property or services exchanged for shares, there is a perpetual risk
that a judicial body may some day disagree with that valuation. If
property has been accepted in payment, "that property must be
fully equal to the value placed upon it, and its value is determined by
the fact and not by the opinions of the persons turning it over, even
though they may have honestly believed it to be worth the amount
certified."26 But can value be a fact? Value is opinion, and opinions
may differ. Even the opinions of two juries, sitting at about the same
time, may differ as to the value of the same property,27 and the valua-
tion of persons about to embark on a business for profit is almost
certain to differ from that of a court or jury summoned by a crew of
salvagers to view the derelict and estimate the value it had at the out-
set of the venture.
In practice, the true value rule puts a penalty upon a shareholder,
even though neither he, as a vendor to the corporation, nor the di-
rectors, as representing the corporate purchaser, may have been guilty
of a fraudulent overvaluation; he will suffer the penalty because a
24L. 19o5, G. C. L. § 4. Repealed L. 1921, p. 365. See $os1 p. 416.
25 Comp. L. (1917) § 862, amended L. 1921, C. 22, p. 73. In Union Pacific R. R.
v. Blair, 48 Utah, 38, 156 Pac. 948 (I916), the failure to file the affidavit did not
subject the shareholders to liability to the amount of the par value of their shares,
but only to the extent that the par value exceeded the true value of the property
turned in.
26Dee Co. v. Proviso Coal Co., 290 Ill. 252, 125 N. E. 24 (1919); Linden Bros. v.
Practical Elec. Pub. Co., 3o9 Ill. 132, I4O N. E. 874 (1923); Meyer v. Ruby Trust
Mining and Milling Co., 192 Mo. 162, 189, 90 S. W. 821 (1905); Bobb v. Wal-
mar Theatre Co. et al., 206 Mo. App. 236, 227 S. W. 841 (1920). 5 THoMPso-N,
op. cit. supra note 18, § 3991; 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 20, § 3576; BALLAN-
TINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) 657-27Suggested in Schenck et al. v. Andrews, 57 N. Y. 133, 143 (I874).-
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judicial body has come to disagree with their conscientious valuation.
Since the purpose of corporation laws is tc encourage association for
business enterprises, the interjection of this principle may tend to
defeat the object of the law. Furthermore, to the extent that the
penalty imposed under the true value rule is paid to persons who have
not been misled by overvaluation, the benefit will accrue to a class of
persons undeserving of it. It is generally true that creditors or in-
vestors who had knowledge of the facts of overvaluation may not
enforce the consequences of the true value rule, even against share-
holders who were conscious participators in a fraudulent over-
valuation.28 So, too, persons who dealt with the corporation before
the transaction complained of took place, may not inquire into the
equality of values in that transaction.2 9 Thus, in a defensive way,
courts apply the principles of the law of deceit. Conversely, persons
who have actually been defrauded through the chicanery of deliberate
overvaluation of the consideration paid for shares, ought to have
actions in deceit against the persons who committed the fraud intend-
ing to deceive. But the existence of the true value rule, like that
requiring a preliminary valuation by the state, is intended to assure
persons dealing with a corporation that full value has in fact been
paid in, to entitle them to dispense with the necessity of investigating
the facts, and to give them the benefit of a presumption of reliance
upon the apparent or professed amount of corporate capital.2 0 A
state policy which induces persons dealing with a corporation to
shirk the responsibility of investigating the nature and value of
corporate assets, and then rewards them for their recklessness, or
even indifference, is of doubtful morality and wrings harsh justice
from conscientious shareholders. A person who is about to enter into
transactions of magnitude with an individual makes inquiry into the
state of his financial circumstances. Should he not take reasonable
precautions when about to deal with a corporation? Should he be
able to claim that he is deceived if he does not?", True enough, he
28Coit v. N. C. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343, 7 Sup. Ct. 231 (1886);
Sherman v. Harley, 178 Calif. 584, 174 Pac. goi (1918). Contra: DuPont v.
Ball, ii Del. Ch. 430, lO6 AtI. 39 (1918); Easton Nat. Bank. v. American Brick
Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 732, 64 Atl. 917 (19o6). Note on creditor's knowledge of over-
valuation as affecting his right against shareholders, (1920) 7 A. L. R. 972. BAL-
LANTINE, op. citI. supra note 26, at 675.
29Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, H1 Sup. Ct. 530 (1891); Hospes v. North-
western Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 117 (1892); Bobb v. Walmar Theatre
Co., supra note 26.
3
"Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., supra note 29.
"Schenck v. Andrews, supra note 27, at 143. Pell's Case, supra note z8.
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should not be under obligation to do more than take reasonable pre-
cautions, and what will be reasonable will depend principally upon
the availability of the information which he needs for self-protection.
It is for this reason, as will be presently insisted, that publicity
should be required to be given to the facts relating to corporate
capitalization.
The test of equality of values is to be made as of the time of pay-
ment; there is no guaranty of the maintenance of that equality,
except that capital shall not be returned to shareholders. In reality,
the creditor's concern is not in the past value of corporate capital,
but in the value of the assets of the corporation at the time he deals
with it. Obviously, therefore, the remedy afforded as a result of the
guaranty, is based upon the fiction that persons dealing with the
corporation have placed reliance upon a representation, not as to
what the corporate assets are at the time they deal with it, but that
the consideration constituting the capital was, at the time it was
received by the corporation, equal to the value at which it was re-
ceived.
Opposed to the true value rule is "the good faith rule" which pre-
vails in England 2 and the majority of American jurisdictions.n
Under this rule, the inequality between the actual value of property
and the value at which it was received will not, of itself, subject the
shareholder to liability. It must first be shown that there was a lack
of good faith in estimating the value at which the property was to be
received by the corporation. This principle finds statutory' expres-
sion in the very common provision: "Any corporation may purchase
any property authorized by its certificate of incorporation, or neces-
sary for the use and lawful purposes of such corporation, and may
issue stock to the amount of the value thereof in payment therefor,
and the stock so issued shall be full paid stock and not liable to any
further call, neither shall the holder thereof be liable for any further
payment under any of the provisions of this chapter; and in the
absence of fraud in the transaction the judgment of the directors as to
the value of the property purchased shall be conclusive." - Such a
statutory provision is not only a legislative attempt to protect -the
32Pell's Case, supra note I8. I PALMER'S COMPANY PRECEDENTS (13th ed.
1927) 58.
33Coffin v. Ransdell, iio Ind. 417, I N. E. 20 (1886); Anderson v. Avey, 272
Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921). See discussion and authorities collected in BALLAN-
TINE, loc. cit. supra note 26; 5 FLETCHER, loc. cit. supra note 26; 5 THOMPSON, op.
cit. supra note 26, § 3992; I COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § § 35, 45b.
34N. Y., S. C. L. § 69.
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shareholder, but is also a legislative warning to persons dealing with
the corporation."
Butwhat is "fraud" the presence of which will vitiate the conclusive-
ness of the judgment of the directors? If it is a mental state, then, it
has been suggested, that one trouble with the good faith rule is "the
difficulty of fathoming the human mind, and the courts often differ on
this subject even in the same transaction".36 A New York court in
applying the statute of 1853, 3  said: "The real question, therefore, is
whether the property was placed and taken at a higher valuation
with a fraudulent purpose, with the intent of evading the provisions
of the statute. . . All that is necessary to establish the legal fraud
and take the stock issued out of the immunity assured to stock
honestly issued in pursuance of the act of '853 is to prove two facts:
(i) That the stock issued exceeded in amount the value of the
property in exchange for which it was issued; and (2) That the trustees
deliberately and with knowledge of the real value of the property
overvalued it, and paid in stock for it an amount which they knew
was in excess of its actual value."3 8 It was upon this issue of fraud
that juries in two actions disagreed." New Jersey courts in constru-
ing the statutory provision that "in the absence of actual fraud in the
transaction, the judgment of the directors as to the value of the prop-
erty purchased shall be conclusive," have said that "the judgment of
those who are by law entrusted with the power of issuing stock 'to the
amount of the value of the property', and on whom, therefore, is
placed the first duty of valuing the property, must be accorded con-
siderable weight, but it cannot be deemed conclusive when duly
35For a criticism of the judicial interpretation of such a statutory provision,
see infra note 40.
21W. W. Cook, op. cit. supra note 23, at 587. Cf. Douglas v. Ireland, 73 N. Y.
100 (1878); Brockway v. Ireland, 61 How. Pr. 372 (N. Y. I88O). Mr. Cook also
makes a comparison of Jackson v. Traer, 64 Iowa, 469 (1884) and Clark v. Bever,
139 U. S. 96, 1I Sup. Ct. 468 (I891); Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn,
x36 Fed. 915 (C. C. N. Y. I9O5), aff'd, 148 Fed. 102o and 210 U. S. 206, 28 Sup.
Ct. 634 (i9o8), and Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, 74 N. E.
653 (19o5), .. C. 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193 (I9O8), 225 U. S. III, 32 Sup. Ct.
641 (1912).
37L. 1853, c. 333, corporations "may purchase mines, manufacturies and other
property necessary for their business, and issue stock to the amount of the value
thereof in payment therefore; and the stock so issued shall be declared and taken
to be full paid and not liable to any further calls; neither shall the holders thereof
be liable for any further payments under the provisions of the tenth section of
the said act."38Douglas v. Ireland, supra note 36, at 3O4. See also Lake Superior Iron Co. v.
Drexel, 9o N. Y. 87 (1882).
39Brockway v. Ireland, supra note 36.
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subjected to judicial scrutiny. Nor is it necessary that conscious
overvaluation or any other form of fraudulent conduct on the part of
these primary valuers should be shown to justify judicial interposition.
Their honest judgment, if reached without due examination into the
elements of value, or if based in part upon an estimate of matters
which really are not property, or if plainly warped by self-interest,
may lead to a violation of the statutory rule as surely as would corrupt
motive." 40
It is significant that in none of the cases just referred to 4' was relief
sought by, or for the benefit of persons who claimed that they had
been deceived by misrepresentations as to the corporate capital. The
transactions involved were upset because the valuations constituted a
fraud on the act, behind which was the policy of guaranteeing that
the "capital stock of all corporations should at the start represent the
same value whether paid for in property or in money."' 2 Without
these statutory provisions, the principles of the law of deceit would
have protected the corporation against the fraud of its vendor, and
would have protected investors or creditors against the corporation or
against particular individuals who had misled them into dealing with
the corporation. In Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn,43 the
investors failed in attempting to proceed through an alleged right of
the corporation against the promoters based purely upon principles of
corporation law. The Supreme Court seems to have been influenced
in part by the consideration that "if the corporation recovers, all
stockholders, guilty as well as innocent, get the benefit. . . And
this means that two-fifteeiiths of the stock of the corporation, the
20,000 shares sold to the public, are to be allowed to use the name of
the corporation to assert rights against Lewisohn's estate that will
40Donald v. American Smelting Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 729, 731-2, 48 Atl. 771 (19oo):
action to enjoin allotment of shares for property at an overvaluation. Injunction
granted. The court suggests a distinction between this situation and that where
the issue is an accomplished fact. In the former case, the judgment of the direc-
tors is of "considerable weight," whereas in the latter case it would be "con-
clusive". But this distinction was repudiated in See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J.
Eq. 36, 56, 61 Atl. 843 (19o5). The interpretation of statutes declaring the
judgment of the directors to be conclusive is discussed by G. W. Wickersham,
The Capital of a Corporation (1909) 22 HARV. L. REv. 319.
41 01d Dominion Co. v. Lewisohn and Same v. Bigelow; Douglas v. Ireland and
Brockway v. Ireland; and See v. Heppenheimer. Donald v. American Smelting
Co., is to be distinguished as the bill was brought to enjoin a threatened stock
issue not yet completed.
4See v. Heppenheimer, supra note 4o, at 55. Also Douglas v. Ireland, supra
note 36, at 104.43Supra note 36.
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enure to the benefit of thirteen-fifteenths of the stock that are totally
without claim."" But would the defrauded investors have failed had
they brought actions in their own right founded on the principles of
deceit? Upon the argument of the Lewisohn case in the Supreme
Court, it was assumed that "the new members had no ground for a
suit in their own names". Mr. Justice Holmes said in his opinion,
"We shall not consider whether the new members had a personal
claim of any kind, and therefore we deal with the case without
prejudice to that question, aad without taking advantage of what we
understand the petitioner to concede." 45 For the investor or creditor
defrauded through misrepresentation as to corporate assets, the law
of deceit affords adequate protection. 46 The law of deceit, however,
is not adequate to protect investors and creditors who sustain loss
because of their inability to ascertain the truth that lies behind ap-
pearances. For them, the common law must be supplemented by
statute, but the needed supplement is not one that supplies an illusory
state guarantee, whatever its form, but one that supplies an oppor-
tunity for accurate information. "With regard to the protection of
creditors and investors it has been truly said that legislation cannot
protect people from the consequences of their own imprudence, reck-
lessness or want of experience. Nor can the Legislature supply them
with prudence, judgment or business habits. It can, however, make
it possible for the creditor or investor to obtain the information
necessary to enable him to form a judgment." 47
When an investor or creditor knows that the property of the cor-
poration with which he is dealing consists largely of patent rights, or
of oil or mining property, should his attitude toward the corporate
valuation of that property be other than cautious doubt? Many
states have caused their statutes, to this extent, to coincide with
common sense and have framed them upon the assumption that at
least persons who deal with a mining corporation are making a
speculation on the actual value of its property and are not placing
reliance on the par value of its outstanding shares.4 8
412Io U. S. 206, 213-14, 28 Sup. Ct. 634 (i9o8).
451bid. at 213; see also at 216: "We express no opinion as to whether...there
was any persofal claim on the part of the innocent subscribers."
4 Little, Promoters' Frauds (I9*O) 5 ILL. L. REv. 87.
47Portion of statement by Comptroller of the Company's Department in a
Blue Book published by the English Government, June, 1907, and quoted by W.
W. Cook, op. cit. supra note 23, at 595, I COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923)
§ 45b. For additional quotation from same statement, see infra note 61.
482 Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 5970: "--- provided that on mines any arbitrary
value may be fixed and such value shall, regardless of the actual value, be deemed
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Another practice which seems consistent with good business sense
but inconsistent with a state warranty of the full payment of the par
value of shares is that sanctioned by the decision in Handley v. Stutz.49
It was there held that an active corporation, finding its original capital
impaired by loss or misfortune, may, for the purpose of recuperating
and of producing new conditions for the successful prosecution of its
business, allot new shares for the best price obtainable even though
that be less than the par value. This doctrine has received express
judicial approval in but a limited number of states.50 To rescue the
corporation by the allotment of. shares at the best price obtainable,
even though that be below par, is advantageous to both shareholders
and existing creditors, and it will not be injurious to future creditors
who exercise that caution which the very adoption of this rule requires
of them. However, the establishment of the rule through deliberate
legislation would be more appropriate than through a too liberal
judicial interpretation of legislative intention. In Maryland, Rhode
Island, Virginia and West Virginia there is express statutory authority
for the allotment of par value shares for cash or other consideration
at less than par, and this privilege may be exercised even by corpora-
tions not in failing circumstances.5' The committee which was
the value thereof, so as to make the stock issued in payment therefor at such
arbitrary value full paid stock." See also Colo. Comp. L. (1921) § § 2249, 2341;
I Nev. R. L. (1912) §§ 1200, 1330; Utah, I Comp. L. (1917) § 862, amended L.
1921, c. 22, p. 73, Richardson v. Treasure Hill Mining Co., 23 Utah 366, 65 Pac.
74 (1901). Contra: Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., 184 Calif. 367,194 Pac. x1 (1920).
2 MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 830; 5 FLETCHER, Op. Cit.
supra note 26, § 3508; note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 437. Many Blue Sky Laws
attempt to protect investors against fraudulent sales of mining lands or shares
in mining corporations.
t9139 U. S. 417, II Sup. Ct. 530 (1891).
"'Speer v. Bordeleau, 20 Colo. App. 413, 79 Pac. 332 (1905); Peter v. Union
Mfg. Co., 56 Ohio St. 181, 46 N. E. 894 (1897), suit by minority shareholder;
Thorns and Brenneman v. Goodman, 254 Fed. 39, 44, (C. C. A. 6th, 1918), inter-
preting Ohio statute, noted in (1919) 3 MINN. L. REV. 281. Contra: Mutual
Adjusting Agency v. Davidson, 23 Calif. App. 274, 137 Pac. IO9i (1913), noted in
(1914) 2 CALIF. L. REV. 238; but see Stein v. Howard, 65 Calif. 616 (1884), relied
upon by the Supreme Court, and Kellerman v. Maier, 116 Calif. 416,423,48 Pac.
377 (1897); Jackson v. Traer, 64 Iowa, 469 (1884); Lee v. Cameron, 67 Okla. 8o, 169
Pac. 17 (1917), the Oklahoma constitution forbids the issue of shares except
"for money, labor done, or property actually received to the amount of par value
thereof..." For a discussion of Handley v. Stutz and Ooregum Gold Mining Co.
v. Roper, L. R. [18921 A. C. 125, see (1891) 25 Am. L. REV. 940; (1892) 26 ibid.
464 and 861; (1893) 27 ibid. 3o6.
511 Md. Ann. Code (1924) art 23, § 43, derived from L. 1920, c. 545; R. I. Gen.
L. (1923) § 3995, derived from L. 1922, C. 2186; Va. Code (1924) § 3788, reen-
acted L. 1926, p. 930, derived from L. 1902-3-4, p. 437, c. 5, § 9; W. Va., Barnes
Ann. Code'(1923) p. 1105.
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charged with the revision of the Ohio corporation law in 1927 have
with more conservatism taken a middle position: the corporation
must have been organized for at least two years and the directors
must have found that par could not be obtained for the shares to be
allotted, but there is not the qualification, found in Handley v. Stutz,
that the new money must be needed for recuperation rather than for
expansion of the business.52 The doctrine of Handley v. Stutz has not
the critical importance that it once had, for'now a corporation which
finds that the market price of its shares has depreciated below par
value, may raise new capital by taking advantage of the permission
given in practically every state to create shares without par value.
To promote the sound business practice of enabling a corporation to
secure additional capital through stock issues rather than by increas-
ing its indebtedness, is but one of the reasons for the introduction of
non-par value statutes. The importance of such statutes is that they
manifest the state policy to refuse continued support to the supposed
reliance of persons dealing with corporations upon the importance of
par value and nominal capitalization. They remove the state
guarantee, and they concentrate attention upon the facts of capitali-
zation. Of this policy, it has been remarked: "So far as creditors are
concerned there is, under such legislation, nothing to be said but
caveat creditor."5s And again: "The whole theory of stock without
"Ohio L. 1927, p. I6. "Section x6. Shares with par value may be issued for an
amount of consideration not less than the parvalue thereof except as herein other-
wise provided. The board of directors may authorize the issuance of shares with
par value at a price greater than par.
"A corporation by action of its board of directors may issue and sell shares
having par value or securities convertible into shares having par value, or give
options to purchase shares having par value, for an amount of consideration less
than the par value of such shares or of such shares as may be issued upon the con-
version of such securities or exercise of such options if
(i) The corporation has been in existence more than two years; and
(2) The board of directors shall find that such shares cannot be sold at par; and
(3) The board of directors shall fix a price for such shares at less than par and
cause them to be offered to existing shareholders at such price; and
(4) All of the shares so offered shall not have been purchased by existing share-
holders."
The balance of the section authorizing the sale for less than par of the shares not
taken by shareholders, and requiring the filing with the secretary of state of a
verified certificate stating the number and par value of shares and the price at
which issued, is omitted. The Ohio committee, in its report dated January 16,
1928, proposes a revision of this section to clarify its meaning, without, apparently,
changing its effect.
6E. H. Warren, The Progress of the Law: Corporations (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv.
282, 286.
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par Value is, 'let the buyer beware' and 'let the creditor beware', but
caveat emptor-no implied warranty of quality-applies only when the
goods are available for inspection. Better the old law, 'let the
promoter beware'.' '4
One who is about to extend credit to an individual guards himself
by inquiring as to the financial circumstances of that individual.
Should not one who is about to deal with a corporation take the same
precaution? The answer is "yes" if we insert the word "reasonable"
before the word "precaution". The prospective creditor of the indi-
vidual and the prospective creditor of the corporation have not had
an equal opportunity of obtaining that necessary information as to the
financial condition of their proposed debtor. The conviction that
this is true has been the directing force in the evolution of this part of
corporation law. The practice of officially appraising the considera-
tion to be received in payment for shares, the trust fund doctrine and
the full value rule, and the concurrently imposed liabilities, all find
their justification in the fact that investors and creditors have had no
adequate means of ascertaining the facts about corporate assets and
about the private contracts between the corporation and the share-
holders.
The use of non-par value shares does not eliminate the necessity of
valuing the consideration to be received for the shares. A valuation
is necessary in order that the rights and interests of shareholders may
remain proportionate to the amount of their investments, or, in the
discretion of the proper parties, in proportion to the market value
of the outstanding shares at the time of the allotment of new shares.
Valuation is necessary in order to fix the amount that is to be con-
sidered capital and the amount that is to be considered paid-in
surplus.55 Valuation is necessary in order to fix the capital stock
which enters into the calculation of the funds available for the declara-
tion of dividends."5 The institution of non-par value shares has been
T. W. COOK, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW (1925) 153, note 4.
nUniform Bus. Corp. Act § 24: "Paid-in Surplus. I. If, upon the allotment of
shares having no par value any part of the consideration received by the corpo-
ration is to be treated as paid-in surplus rather than as payment upon such shares,
the incorporators, shareholders or directors, as the case may be, who determine
the value of the consideration so received, shall at that time specify the amount of
such value that is to be considered as surplus and the amount thereof that is to be
considered payment for shares. II. Amounts of surplus paid in by shareholders
shall be shown on the books of the corporation as a separate item designated
'paid-in surplus'." See also Ohio Act of 1927, § 38; A. A. Berle, Problems of Non-
Par Stock (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 43.
USection I, paragraph X, of the Uniform Act defines "capital stock" as "(a)
the aggregate amount of the par value of all allotted shares having a par value,
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criticized in that it leaves no check against overvaluation; formerly,
deception was due to the difference between the actual value of the
consideration received and the par value of the shares allotted for it,
but now it is due to the difference between the actual value and that
value at which the corporation receives it in payment for a given
number of shares without par value. Once more, the need for the
publication of the facts with regard to capitalization becomes appar-
ent. If a valuation of the consideration received for non-par value
shares is required to be made, and if that valuation is required to be
published together with an adequate description of the consideration,
then members of the public about to deal with a corporation can learn
much about its financial condition by becoming informed as to the
nature of that consideration, and by comparing their own appraisal of
it with the valuation put upon it by the corporate representatives.
The tendency since igoo has not been entirely away from paternal-
ism, but from one type of paternalism to another. The tendency
seems to have been away from a state guarantee to the corporate
investor and creditor, and toward an effort to assist self-help by afford-
ing the means of self-protection. At the same time, the tendency has
been to discontinue those formal regulations of corporate organization
and management, which, experience has shown, exist only to invite
evasion. With particular reference to corporate capitalization, this
tendency was tersely stated in 1911 in the report of the New York
State Bar Association's Committee on Corporation Law, when, in
speaking of its proposed non-par value statute, it is said that that bill
"prodeeds upon two theories, or rather with reference to two condi-
tions; first, the absolute necessity of telling the truth; secondly, the
relief from the necessity of telling a lie." 7
including such shares allotted as stock dividends, and (b) the aggregate of the
cash, and the value of any consideration other than cash, determined as provided
in this Act, agreed to be given or rendered as payment for all allotted shares
having no par value, plus such amounts as may have been transferred from
surplus upon the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no par value."
Section 25 provides in part, "No corporation shall pay dividends (a) in cash or
property, except from the surplus of the aggregate of its assets over the aggre-
gate of its liabilities, including in the latter the amount of its capital stock, after
deducting from such aggregate of its assets the amount by which such aggregate
was increased by unrealized appreciation in value or revaluation of fixed assets;
(b) in shares of the corporation, except from the surplus of the aggregate of its
assets over the aggregate of its liabilities, including in the latter the amount of its
capital stock."
57Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass'n (I911) 72. At page 65 of th same report, it
is said: "It was in 1892 that this Association first committed-itself to the propo-
sition that the annexing of the par value to the certificate of stock of corporations
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This tendency was also expressed and recommended in 19o2 in the
report to the Massachusetts legislature of its committee on Corpora-
tion Laws. "Under the modem theory, the state owes no duty, to
persons who may choose to deal with corporations, to look after the
solvency of such artificial bodies; nor to stockholders, to protect them
from the consequences of going into such concerns, the idea being that,
in the case of ordinary business corporations, the state's duty ends in
providing clearly that creditors and stockholders shall at all times be
precisely informed of all the facts attending both the organization and
the management of such corporations, and particularly that there
should be full publicity given to all details of the original organization
thereof." 58 It was as a result of this recommendation that the
Massachusetts legislature in 1903 repealed the provision for the state
appraisal of the consideration to be received for shares, and, in place of
this policy which had nurtured a false sense of security, substituted
the equirement that there should be filed in a public office a certificate
showing the number of shares outstanding, the proportion thereof
paid for in money and the proportion paid for in consideration other
than money, and in the latter case, a description of such considera-
tion.59
With regard to section 88 of the English Companies Act providing
that when shares are to be allotted for consideration other than cash,
a return of the number of shares so allotted and the consideration for
which they have been allotted shall be filed with the registrar of
companies,60 it has been said that "the object of this section is to
afford those who deal or propose to deal with a company the means of
was a source, and an unnecessary source, of confusion and misapprehension in the
public mind; that it also involved a constant invitation to what may be called
an evasion of the law in order to enable business enterprises perfectly properin
purpose to accomplish that proper purpose; and that it compelled corporations to
state what all the community and what many conscientious managers of corpo-
rations have found to be an embarrassing estimate of value when the statements
of the stock certificates in the aggregate were compared with the inventories of the
corporation taken upon a commercial basis rather than with reference to statutory
statements." The progress of the non-par value proposal in this association may
be traced through the following references: N. Y. State Bar Ass'n Report (1892)
x38; id. (19o8) 43, 44, 196; id. (1909) 270-282; id. (I9io) 515-517; id. (1911)
54-80.
58Report of the Committee on Corporation Laws, created by Acts of 19o2, c.
335 (J903) 21.
"'L. 1903, c. 437, § 14; 2 Mass. Gen. L. (1921) C. i56, § 16.
6OEnglish Companies (Consolidation) Act 19o8, § 88.
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ascertaining approximately the position of the company as regards its
issued shares."8 '
At about the same time that Massachusetts adopted this policy of
publicity, there was incorporated in the constitution and laws of
Virginia a provision that a corporation might dispose of its stocks or
bonds at such prices as it sees fit, that subscriptions for shares might
be paid in money, other property or services, and that "there shall be
no personal or individual liability on any subscriber beyond the obli-
gation to comply with such terms as he may have agreed to in his
contract of subscription", provided the corporation has filed with the
state corporation commission a verified statement containing a full
disclosure of the financial plan and an accurate description of the
property or services together with a statement of the valuation
at which the same are to be received by the corporation.62 It has
been held that if the provisions of this act have been complied with,
shares of an aggregate par value of $40,000 were fully paid for by
turning over to the company "rights, options and contracts being
valued at four thousand dollars".6
As pointed out already, both the Maryland" and Rhode Island"'
corporation laws, as amended in 1920, also permit corporations to
accept less than full par value for their par value shares, but in
both states this is made conditional upon the filing of an exposure of
the facts, i.e., a statement of the- amount of stock to be issued, a
description of the property or services to be received, and a statement
of the value at which they are being received. In all three of these
states, the obligation of the shareholder is limited to the performance
of his contractual obligation, the existence of the statute puts the
creditor on notice of this fact, and the information publicly filed
furnishes him with the means of self-protection .6
611 PALMER, op. cit. supra note 32 63. In an English Blue Book published
in 1907, supra note 47, it is said: "The trend of recent legislation in this
country has been to endeavor to afford information concerning the joint stock
companies to all who may seek for it, on the ground that publicity is the best
protection which can be devised for the benefit of creditors and investors, and
that, moreover, it is fair to demand publicity of companies and to compel dis-
closure of material facts by them in return for the privilege of limited liability."
62Va. Const. (1902) § 167; Va. L. 1902-3-4, p. 437, c. 5, § 9; Ann. Code (1924)
§ 3788, reenacted without change L. 1926, p. 930.
63Monk v. Barnett, 113 Va. 635, 75 S. E. 185 (1912).
4i Md. Ann. Code (1924) Art. 23, § 43; L. 1920, c. 545.
65R. I. Gen. L. (1923) § 3495; L. 1920, c. 1925, § 30, amended by L. 1922, C.
2186.
16 To this extent the statutes of Maryland, Rhode Island and Virginia go beyond
the effect of the English Companies Act (19o8) § § 14, 88 and 123, for under these
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By an amendment to the Illinois law in 1921, the provision requir-
ing the incorporators to report their valuation to the secretary of
state was supplanted by the provisions requiring the filing of a descrip-
tion and a statement of the valuation of the property received for
shares.67 No case has been found, however, which indicates that this
amendment alters Illinois' adherence to the full value rule.68
In that carefully conceived act passed in Ohio in 1927, publicity has
been adopted as the means of safe-guarding those who deal with
corporations. 9 With regard to this feature of the act, the views of
the Ohio committee may be stated in their own words: "It is believed
that the liability to creditors which will obtain in case property is
probably overvalued,70 and the requirement of filing such certificate
in the office of the secretary of state, will operate'as an effective
deterrent against the issuing of shares for little or no consideration.
The committee considers this to be one of the outstanding merits of
this draft. It removes the chief objection that has been made against
non-par shares, namely, that under the laws of certain states there is
the greatest latitude and freedom in issuing them. If this draft is
adopted, Ohio will not be one of the wide open states as to the issuing
of non-par shares, and yet there will be sufficient latitude to enable
honest directors and shareholders to issue such shares from time to
time in accordance with the requirements of the corporation." 7'
A consideration of the modem tendencies of the law with regard to
sections par value shares may not be paid for with consideration agreed to be
worth less than the par value of the shares. See PALMER, Op. Cit. supra note 32,
at 57-68. The W. Va. statute, supra note 51, permits par value shares to be paid
for with consideration valued at less than par, but, except for the provision that
notice of the purpose of the meeting at which the authorization is to be voted
on shall be published in a newspaper for two weeks, there is no requirement that
the facts with regard to the payment for the shares shall be made a public record.
672 Callaghan's Ill. Stat. Ann. (1924) c. 32, § § 4 and 28; L. 1921, p. 365, amend-
ed by L. 1923, p. 283 and L. 1927, p. 354. The nature of the payment is to be
disclosed either in the articles of incorporation or in a certificate to be filed within
thirty days after any subsequent allotment of shares.
68Supra note 26.
69L. 1927, p. 16, § 16, and p. 2o, § 26.T0By § 25, the valuation at which consideration is received in payment for
shares shall be conclusive unless the person asserting overvaluation "shall affirm-
atively prove by clear and convincing evidence, and otherwise than by proving
the difference between the value of such considerations and the amount so de-
termined, that such determination of value was knowingly and intentionally
made and fixed at an amount known to the parties making the same to be greater
than the fair value of such considerations to the corporation."7tReport to Ohio Bar Ass'n of the Special Committee on Revision of Corpo-
ration Laws, Dec. 28, 1926, at 32.
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stock issues would be incomplete were not reference made to Blue Sky
Laws which have been so universally adopted in this country. These
laws have grown up independently of corporation acts, even though
their effect is to supplement the latter, and it is to be noted that the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is
separately considering a Unifom Sale of Securities Act. A second
tentative draft of such an act was submitted to the Conference in 1924.
Existing Blue Sky Laws are aimed at protecting the investor and
not the corporate creditor. Furthermore, the investors whom they
purport to protect are not always merely the investors in corporate
securities. Within the scope of the New York act are: "any commo-
dity dealt in on any exchange within the United States of America or
the delivery of which is contemplated by transfer of negotiable
documents of title all of which are hereinafter called commodities,
or. . .any stocks, bonds, notes evidences of interest or indebtedness
or other securities, or negotiable documents of title, or foreign cur-
rency orders, calls or options therefor hereinafter called security or
securities. ..,,7 In the next place, it is common for these acts, in
defining the "sales" which they regulate to exempt from such regula-
tion distributions by corporations of shares, bonds or other securities
exclusively to their own shareholders or other security holders. 73 The
scheme of these acts is to provide for licensing the "vendors", and for
gathering and publishing material information with regard to the
securities or commodities to be marketed, but they usually disavow
any purpose of guaranteeing or recommending the value of such
securities or commodities. 74
This brief comparative study of the legal treatment of stock issues
is the history of the conflict of those who deal with a corporation and
and those who are its members. The state's settlement of this conflict
evidences the social interests that are found to predominate at a given
time. Prior to the nineteenth century, the policy of encouraging the
aggregation of wealth for industrial development and commercial
expansion determined the balance in favor of the shareholders and
produced for them a real limited liability. Then, with the beginning
7N. Y. Gen. Bus. L., Art. 23A, § 352, amended by L. 1927, c. 365.
73So provided in the securities acts of the following states: Arkansas, California,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
71So provided in the securities acts of the following states: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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of the nineteenth century, the hardship on corporate creditors became
sufficiently impressive to produce for them not only a guarantee of a
real corporate capital, but also the additional protection of the con-
tingent liability of shareholders. The practical necessity of permit-
ting property to be transferred in payment for shares precipitated the
dilemma of attempting to secure a parity between the value of the
property and the par of the shares, and of attempting to prevent the
deception of investors and creditors which was believed to be an
incident of disparity. The state's solution of the dilemma was
usually a guarantee to the unknowing investor or creditor that a
disparity did not exist, or that the discrepancy, if any actually existed,
would be supplied from the individual wealth of those whose shares
were paid for with property of inadequate value. The statutory
provisions enacted for the protection of the investor and creditor at
the expense of the shareholder received a formal, but not a gdnuine
compliance; 5 their existence left the shareholder in anxious doubt as
to his security from liability,7 6 and their strict enforcement would
have defeated the purpose of incorporation statutes.7 7
The twentieth century seemed to bring new light. The state is
assuming less responsibility for the corporations which it authorizes
to take part in the social economy. The tendency has been toward
conformity with the realities of business experience: persons who deal
with corporations do not rely upon the nominal value of shares; they
do rely upon such information as they can obtain as to the nature and
value of corporate assets. Permission has been given to remove the
nominal value from shares; the machinery is now being supplied to
furnish investors and creditors with the information they need for
self-protection. The publishing of this information will be the share-
holder's means of self-protection from individual liability.
The conclusions which are deduced from this survey and which
751 COOK, op. cit. supra note 33, § 45b.
76G. W. Wickersham, op. cit. supra note 40, at 321; W. B. Hale, A Field for
Corporate Law Revision: Stockholders' Liability to Creditors (1917) 12 ILL. L.
REV. 6.
77Mr. Cook quotes from President Eliot: "The principle of limited liability is
by far the most effective legal invention for business purposes made in the 19th
century." Cook, op. cit. supra note-23. See also CooK, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATION LAW (1925) 156, quoting from the London Statist, "April 6, 1907, as
follows: "It seems to me that in condemning watered capital the American public
are led by theorists. If a law prohibiting the issue of stock unless for par in cash
had existed in that country in the past, many of what are now big systems would
never have been built; and if in the future the capital of railroads is to represent
no more than the money spent, it follows that no new railroads will be built,
unless by existing dividend-paying system."
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have been the foundation of the pertinent provisions of the tentatively
approved Uniform Business Corporation Act may now be suggested.
First: A shareholder should be under no liability to the corporation
with iespect to his shares other than the obligation of complying with
the terms of his subscription contract therefor, but one who acquired
shares without knowledge or notice of the fact that they had not been
fully paid for, should not be liable to the corporation with respect to
such shares.
Second: The liability of a shareholder to corporate creditors, as
such, should not extend beyond
A. Such direct statutory liability to employees as the policy of a
particular state may require, and
B. The right of the creditor, by equitable execution, to avail him-
self of the obligation of the shareholder to the corporation as
defined in the first paragraph.
Third: By requiring a description and valuation of the considera-
tion received in payment for shares to be filed in a public office, per-
sons dealing with a corporation will be afforded an opportunity (a) to
discover the character of the corporate capital, (b) sometimes, but not
always, to place their own valuation upon such consideration, and
(c) to learn much about the corporate finances by comparing their
valuation with that fixed by those acting for the .corporation.
Fourth: For the purpose of determining the outstanding obligation
of a shareholder to the corporation with respect to his shares, the
valuation at which consideration other than money was agreed to be
received by the corporation in payment for shares shall be conclusive.
A deliberate overvaluation, consciously agreed upon by both the cor-
poration and the shareholder should not alter the liability of the share-
holder to the corporation and subject him to an obligation to pay
more than he had agreed to.7 8
7SThese conclusions have been substantially adopted by the new Ohio corpo-
ration act: shares may beissued for property or services, and par value shares may
be issued even for money at less than par; shareholders are under no liability to
the corporation except to pay the amount and kind of consideration for which
their shares were authorized to be issued; a creditor has no claim against share-
holders, as such, other than to reach and apply the debt, if any, of the share-
holders to the'corporation; the valuation at which consideration other than
money is agreed to be accepted in payment for shares is conclusive, unless the
party claiming overvaluation shall affirnatively prove, otherwise than by merely
showing the difference between the actual and the agreed value, that the value
was knowingly and intentionally fixed at an amount known to be greater than
the fair value of the consideration; within sixty days after the issue of shares at
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Fifth: Fraud practiced by a promoter or other vendor in contract-
ing with an innocent corporation, whether with regard to the payment
for shares to be allotted to him or otherwise, should entitle the cor-
poration to the usual remedies of a defrauded contracting party,
i.e., rescission, restitution or damages.
Sixth: Persons dealing with a corporation, whether they be in-
vestors or creditors, if deceived by fraudulent overvaluations, would
have their tort remedies against (a) the corporation, and (b) such
shareholders as intentionally participated in the fraudulent decep-
tion. In any action brought for this purpose,. the valuation at which
the corporation received the consideration in payment for shares
should not be conclusive, but the plaintiff should be able to show the
true value, provided he can establish the defendant's intent to
deceive the plaintiff and the fact of plaintiff's deception. The filing
of the description and valuation of the consideration should not result
in charging persons dealing with the corporation with constructive
notice of the facts there stated, but such filing, to the extent that it
furnishes such persons with an opportunity for acquiring information,
should have a bearing upon the actuality of their deception.7 9
PRovisioNs OF THP TENTATIVELY APPROVED UNIFORM BUSNESS
CORPORATION ACT RELATING TO THE ALLOTMENT OF
SHARES AND PAYMENT THEREFOR
SECTION i. Defiunitions.
IV. An "Incorporator" is one of the signers of the original articles
of incorporation.
V. A "Subscriber" is one who subscribes for shares in a corporation,
whether before or after incorporation.
VI. "Shares" are the units into which the shareholders' rights to
participate in the control of the corporation, in its profits orin the
distribution of corporate assets, are divided.
VII. A "Shareholder" is one who owns one or more shares. A
subscriber becomes a shareholder upon the allotment of shares to
him. Nothing in this section shall be construed as forbidding a
corporation to recognize the exclusive right of a person registered on
less than par, or after the issue of shares for consideration other than money, a
statement must be filed showing the number and class of shares issued and a de-
scription of the consideration. This summary is based on § § 16, 22, 24, 25,26,28.
71Section IO of the Uniform Act provides that the filing of any paper pursuant
to the provisions of the Act shall not charge persons who deal with a corporation
with notice of the contents of such paper. See (1920) 7 A. L. R. 981, note.
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its books as the owner of shares to receive dividends, and to vote as
such owner, or to hold liable for calls and assessments a person
registered on its books as the owner of shares.
VIII. A "Certificate of Stock" is a written instrument signed by the
proper corporate officers, as required by this Act, and evidencing the
fact that the person therein named is the registered owner of the share
or shares therein described.
IX. "Allottment" means the apportioning of a certain number of
shares to a subscriber in response to the aplplication contained in his
subscription, or to a shareholder pursuant to the declaration of a
stock dividend. The allottment of shares to the incorporators, or to
persons whose subscriptions were approved by the incorporators be-
fore incorporation and were unrevoked at the time of incorporation,
shall be considered automatically coincident with incorporation.
SECTION 3. Articles of Incorporation,
I. Articles of incorporation shall be signed [in triplicate originals]
by each of the incorporators and acknowledged by at least three of
them before an officer authorized by the laws of this State to take
acknowledgments, and, in addition to stating the name of the cor-
poration, shall state in the English language:
(a) its purposes;
(b) its duration;
(c) the location and post office address of its registered office in this
State;
(d) the total authorized number of par value shares and their
aggregate part value; and, if any of its shares have no par value, the
authorized number of such shares;
(e) a description of the classes of shares, if the shares are to be
classified, and a statement of the number of shares in each class, and
the relative rights, voting power, preferences and restrictions granted
to or imposed ipon the shares of each class;
(f) the amount of paid-in capital with which the corporation will
begin business;
(g) the first directors, their post office addresses, and their terms of
office;
(h) the name and post office address, of each of the incorporators
and a statement of the number of shares subscribed by each, which
shall not be less than one, and the class of shares for which each
subscribes.
II. Articles of incorporation may contain any other provisions,
consistent with the laws of this State, for regulating the corporation's
business or the conduct of its affairs.
SECTION 6. Subscriptions for Shares before Incorporation.
I. Subscriptions for shares of a corporation to be formed shall be in
writing. Unless otherwise provided in the wiriting, the subscription
shall be
(a) irrevocable for a period of one year from the date of signing
except as provided in subdivision II of this Section;
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(b) revocable after a period of one year from the date of signing,
unless prior to such revocation a certificate of incorporation has been
issued as provided in Section 5-
II. Subscriptions for shares may be revoked at any time by either
party upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the rescission
of any contract.
III. Upon the issue of the certificate of incorporation, subscriptions
for shares may be enforced by the corporation according to their terms
unless revoked as provided in this Section.
SECTION 7. Minimum Amount of Paid-in Capital.
The amount of paid-in capital with which a corporation may begin
business shall not be less than [$] in cash or other property
taken at a fair valuation.
SECTION 13. Shares--Classes of-Par and No Par Value.
I. The shares of a corporation formed under this Act may be
divided into classes with such rights, voting power, preferences and
restrictions as may be provided for in the articles of incorporation.
II. Any or all of the shares may have a par value or have no par
value, as provided in the articles of incorporation.
III. Except'as otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation,
and stated in the certificate of stock, each share shall be in all respects
equal to every other share.
SECTION 15. Shares-Allotment and Consideration.
I. No allotment of shares of a corporation shall be made except:
(a) pursuant to subscriptions received therefor, or
(b) pursuant to the declaration of stock dividends.
II. Subject to the provisions of (here include appropriate reference
to the Sale of Securities Act), subscriptions for shares may be made
payable, as provided in subdivisions III and IV of this Section, with
cash, other property, tangible or intangible, or with necessary services
actually rendered to the corporation.
III. Subscriptions for shares having a par value shall be made pay-
able:
(a) with cash to an amount not less than the aggregate par value
of the shares subscribed for; or
(b) with consideration other than cash, the fair valuation of which
is not less than the aggregate par value of the shares subscribed for.
IV. Subscriptions for shares having no par value shall be made
payable as follows:
(a) if the subscription is signed before incorporation, with con-
sideration of the character and value determined by the incorporators;
(b) if the subscription is signed after incorporation, with considera-
tion of the character and value determined by the shareholders at any
annual or special meeting, duly called and held for that purpose, or
determined by the board of directors acting under authority conferred
by the shareholders or by the articles of incorporation.
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SECTION 16. Issue of Certificate of Stock.
I. A certificate of stock shall not be issued until the shares repre-
sented thereby have been fully paid for.
I. Shares allotted as stock dividends, and shares for which the
agreed consideration has been paid, delivered or rendered to the
corporation shall be fully paid shares [and non-assessable].
III. When a corporation has received a note or uncertified check as
consideration for shares, such shares shall not be considered as fully
paid for until such note or check has been paid.
SECTION 17. Valuation of Consideration for Shares.
For the purpose of determining whether shares have been fully paid
for in order to fix the extent of the outstanding obligation of a share-
holder to the corporation with respect to such shares, the following
valuations shall be conclusive:
(a) the valuation placed by the incorporators, the share-holders .or
the directors, as the case may be, upon the consideration other than
cash with which the subscriptions for shares are made payable;
(b) the valuation placed by the board of directors upon the cor-
porate assets in estimating the surplus to be transferred to capital as
payment for shares to be allotted as stock dividends.
SECTION 18. Filing Report and Affidavit as to Consideration for Shares.
Penalty for Failure to File.
I. Within [30] days after incorporation, and within [90] days after
every subsequent allotment of shares the facts in regard to which have
not been made public in a report previously fied as required by this
Section, the corporation shall file in the office of the [iRecorder of
Deeds in the county] in which the corporation has its registered office,
a report verified by the president or vice-president and by the secre-
tary, assistant secretary or treasurer, and containing:
(a) a statement of the total number of shares allotted up to the date
of the report, the number of such shares that have no par value, the
number of such shares that have a par value, and the par value
thereof;
(b) an accurate, detailed and itemized description of the considera-
tion received or to be received in payment for shares allotted, or
allotted since the date of the last report;
(c) a statement of the valuation put by the incorporators, share-
holders or board of directors, as the case may be, upon the considera-
tion other than cash received or to be received in payment for shares
allotted, or allotted since the date of the last report, and, in case of
shares allotted as a stock dividend, the amount of surplus transferred
to capital in respect of such dividend, whether all or any part of such
surplus was created by a revaluation of assets, and, if so, the value of
the assets on the books of the corporation before and after such re-
valuation, the amount of the surplus or deficit before such revaluation,
and the amount of the surplus after such revaluation.
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IL For every violation of this Section, a corporation shall be liable
to the State in a fine not exceeding [one-tenth of one per cent of the
amount of its capital stock] for each day's omission after the time
limited for the filing of such report.
SECTION 1g. Validity of Shares.
The fact that shares are allotted in violation of, or without full
compliance with the provisions of this Act shall not make the shares so
allotted invalid.
SECrIoN 2o. Liability of Incorporators, Subscribers, Shareholders,
Directors and Officers.
I. A subscriber to or holder of shares of a corporation formed under
this Act shall be under no liability to the corporation with respect to
such shares other than the obligation of complying with the terms of
the subscription therefor; but one who became a shareholder in good
faith and without knowledge or notice that the shares he acquired had
not been fully paid for, shall not be liable to the corporation with
respect to such shares.
II. A shareholder of a corporation formed under this Act shall not
be personally liable for any debt or liability of the corporation [except
as provided in (here include appropriate references to statutory
provisions, if any, imposing personal liability upon shareholders, e. g.,
liability to laborers)].
III. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as in derogation of any
rights which any person may have under the common law or the
principles of equity against an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder,
director, officer or the corporation because of any fraud practised
upon him by any of such persons, or the corporation; or in derogation
of any rights which the corporation may have because of any fraud
practised upon it by any of such persons.
SEcTION 21. Certain Persons Guilty of Misdemeanors. Penalties
therefor.
I. The following persons shall be guilty of misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, each shall be fined not more than [$5,ooo] or imprisoned
for not more than [i] year, or, in the discretion of the court, both fined
and imprisoned:
(a) any incorporator, subscriber, shareholder or director of a cor-
poration formed under this Act who knowingly and wilfully grossly
overvalued the consideration with which subscriptions for shares were
made payable;
(b) any officer or director of a corporation who knowingly and
wilfully allotted, or consented to the allotment of shares, in violation
of the provisions of this Act, or who knowingly and wilfully issued, or
consented to the issue of certificates of stock in violation of the
provisions of this Act;
(c) any incorporator, officer or director who knowingly and wil-
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fully made, or consented to the making of any false statement in any
paper filed in any public office as required by the proiisions of this
Act.
IH. For the purpose of this Section, an incorporator, director, officer
or shareholder shall be presumed to have consented to the doing of a
prohibited act unless he was absent from the meeting of the incor-
porators, directors or shareholders, respectively, at which such act
was authorized, or unless his dissent therefrom was filed at the time in
the registered office of the corporation.
